Home Home - SASR

Solidarity across borders: perspectives on anti-apartheid as a global social movement

By Håkan Thörn

 

 

Anti-apartheid across borders

Through the years millions of people participated in the movement to abolish apartheid in South Africa. A large number of them were living in South Africa and were experiencing the violence of the apartheid system as part of every day life.

But the struggle against apartheid in South Africa also benefited from the support of large numbers of people around the world who were not sharing this direct experience of the apartheid system. People living in various countries like Japan, Holland, India, Sweden, Guyana, Britain, Ghana, Jamaica, Cuba, New Zealand and United States made contributions through taking part in collective action. Most of them had not even been to South Africa. Their support was an act that in the context of the movement was defined through the concept of “solidarity”.

There are a number of different opinions and theories about the causes of the end of apartheid in South Africa - and about the role that the anti-apartheid struggle played in the process that led to the transformation. In these discussions, a distinction between “internal” and “external” factors have been central. On the “internal side”, attention has been paid to the intensified internal struggle during the 1980s, led by the United Democratic Front, and in which the trade unions played a significant role.[1] It is argued that this struggle in the end made South Africa “ungovernable” from the point of view of the apartheid regime. Yet others point to the economic decline in South Africa during the 80s, and South African big business’ changing attitudes towards the apartheid regime, leading to negotiations with the ANC.[2] On the “external side”, one argument emphasises strongly that it was the shift of international power balance that followed the end of the Cold War that ultimately brought apartheid down. This meant that the “communist threat” that had helped the South African government to sustain its position internationally was no longer there and that the Western powers and the Soviet Union started to negotiate about finding solutions to conflicts in Southern Africa.[3] Others emphasise the pressure of the international solidarity movement, resulting in boycotts and sanctions against South Africa.[4]

During my research on the anti-apartheid movement, I have come across a number of accounts about how the struggle “inside” South Africa was constantly influenced by the “outside”, just as the struggle “outside” was influenced by, and dependent on, the struggle “inside”. This displays the difficulty to establish a clear, unambiguous “inside” and “outside” of South Africa in the struggle against apartheid, just as it is difficult to establish any fixed or clear-cut borders in an increasingly globalised world, where people and information increasingly are moving across borders, be it geopolitical, cultural or “racial”.

Such an account is for example provided by Michael Lapsley, to many known as “Father Michael”, one of many anti-apartheid activists that embodied the movements across borders that characterised the anti-apartheid struggle. Lapsley, born and raised in New Zealand, and trained as an Anglican priest in Australia, was sent by his church community to South Africa in 1973 to study at the University of Natal. Here, he also worked as a chaplain to students at campuses, most of them black, and got involved in anti-apartheid activities. Because of this, he was expelled in 1976, and went to live in Lesotho, where he also became a member of the ANC. In the early 80s he spent 9 months in London as an ANC representative, speaking at meetings organised by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM). He then went to Zimbabwe, where he continued to work against apartheid.[5]

Lapsley gives the following examples of the importance of both media and travel, as the anti-apartheid movement outside South Africa also became present within its borders:

To give you an example of a specific moment, there was a particular day, where in three o’ clock in the morning in South Africa, white South Africa got up to watch a rugby match in New Zealand, and the rugby match was stopped by this massive Anti-Apartheid movement in New Zealand. And it was electrifying, because we were told in South Africa, people were being told, look there is a few longhaired layabouts, and suddenly it’s not a group of longhaired layabouts, but it’s actually a broad cross section of society in New Zealand. I think there was enormous appreciation in the majority community that there was an international movement there. And also the (anti-apartheid) leadership and many people in prison talked about that.

 

… Obviously, there were always people who travelled, church people loved travelling, I mean I think that the international church network was often a vehicle for communication, because often political people couldn’t necessarily travel, they didn’t have passports, they were detained, whatever. I mean the churches were having conferences everywhere, so that the South African connection of the faith community coming back into the country I think was very significant, a very significant gateway of communication. And there were people from church networks visiting South Africa as well, those communications remained throughout, they never really stopped. So there was that vehicle of communication in both directions.[6]

 

As I see it, these quotes show that an adequate analysis of the anti-apartheid movement has to pay attention to the construction of networks, organisations, identities, action forms and information flows that transgressed borders. In this sense the anti-apartheid movement could be seen as a part of a complex and multi-layered process that could be defined as a globalisation of politics.[7] In this article, I will attempt to discuss and analyse some aspects of the action forms and identification processes of this movement, and relate it to a political and historical context.[8] The article is divided into three parts. The first part discusses anti-apartheid as a global social movement mainly from a theoretical point of view. The second part looks at anti-apartheid activism through two case studies. The third part is a more general discussion of the action forms of anti-apartheid, emphasising the contexts in which the movement was situated.

 

I. Anti-Apartheid and the globalisation of politics

I would like to argue that the global struggle against apartheid must be seen in the context of the emergence of the “new social movements”, that have addressed global issues in new ways, e.g. solidarity, anti-colonialism, ecology, peace and gender inequality, as well as the increased internationalisation of “old movements” (predominantly labour and church movements).[9]

Although I am arguing that “bordercrossing” is a key for understanding processes of organisation and identification in the anti-apartheid struggle, it is just as important to focus and analyse the prevailing importance of old borders and the construction of new ones in this context. For example, as is stated in the quote above, not all people could travel. In fact, the South African borders were closed to a number of people, who wanted to leave or visit the country. And in the sense of cultural or “racial” borders, not just the politics of the apartheid regime, but also the practice of solidarity work, involved constructing a number of borders between “us” and “them”. Such borders were often related to national identities and interests as well as national political cultures. As this article shows, globalisation does not necessarily mean that the nation state, understood as a political space, is fading away. Rather, the nation state gains new meanings in the context of globalisation, just as globalisation has different meanings in different national contexts.

 

Anti-Apartheid as a social movement

This article views anti-apartheid as a global social movement, to a large extent constituted by “action at a distance”. This is a form of action that, according to sociologist John B Thompson, through the use of communication media, “enables individuals to act for others who are dispersed in space and time, as well as enabling individuals to act in response to actions and events taking place in distant locales”.[10]

I define a social movement as a chain of collective actions that ultimately aim at transforming a social order. A social movement is a process involving as central elements the articulation of social conflicts and collective identities. It is constituted by different forms of practices: production and dissemination of information, knowledge and symbolic practices, mobilisation of various forms of resources, including the construction of organisations and networks, and the performing of public actions of different kinds (demonstrations as well as direct actions).[11] This means that a social movement should not be confused with an “organisation”, or an NGO (although it can include NGO:s), and that it does not consist of the sum of a number of individuals – i. e. it does not presuppose “membership”- but should rather be seen as a space of action. For example, by participating in a boycott against South African goods you performed an action that was a part of constituting anti-apartheid as a social movement.

The approach that I am suggesting implies mainly focusing the analysis on the complex process of interaction through which the strategies and collective identities of a social movement are constructed. This is a process that not only involves consensus building but also tensions and conflicts. Although social movements may appear as homogenous phenomena in public space, they must be understood as constituted by heterogeneous and sometimes contradictory constellations of actions. I would even like to argue that tensions and conflicts are fundamental elements in the dynamic of social movement processes. An adequate analysis of a social movement, including its relations to the social and historical context in which it acts, must therefore not only focus on conflicts between a movement and its adversaries, but on the internal conflicts through which the strategies and identities of the movement are articulated. Such an approach is highly relevant in the case of anti-apartheid, that to a large extent was a “movement of movements”, consisting of an extremely broad alliance between liberation movements and solidarity movements, the latter composed of different “blocs” - churches, unions, political parties (predominantly liberals and social democrats), student movements and solidarity organisations.

In the following, we will take a closer look at the context as well as the internal dynamics of this movement through two case studies, looking at the practices and experiences of two anti-apartheid activists, based in two key anti-apartheid organisations. The transnational space of anti-apartheid will be focused through the case of Enuga S. Reddy and the UN Special Committe Against Apartheid. The role of national contexts will be addressed through the case of Sobizana Mngqikana, exile South African activist in London in 1964-1974, and ANC representative in Stockholm 1974-1979.

 

II. Anti-apartheid in practice - coalitions and conflicts

Working from within the UN

On a number of occasions when I was interviewing anti-apartheid activists in Sweden and Britain about their international contacts, “Mr. Reddy” was mentioned as a key figure. Enuga Reddy was born in 1924 in a small village outside of Madras (now Chennai) in southern India. Both of his parents actively supported the Indian national liberation movement. Reddy himself participated in activities organised by the student movement in Madras. After the end of the 2nd World War, in 1946, Reddy went to New York for postgraduate studies. In 1949 he got a position as a political officer in the UN Secretariat, doing research for the UN on Africa and the Middle East. When the UN Special Committee against Apartheid was formed in 1963, Reddy was appointed its principal secretary, later being promoted as Director of the Centre Against Apartheid, and Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations - until he retired in 1985.[12]

Reflecting on an almost life-long commitment to anti-apartheid, Reddy told me that he always looked upon himself as an activist, but an activist that chose to work from within an institution. However, from this “inside” position he could do a lot for activists on the “outside”, i. e. for the people active in the liberation struggle in Southern Africa as well as the solidarity movements in other parts of the world that supported this struggle.[13] At the time when the Committee was formed, NGO:s did not have the kind of official recognition in the UN that they have at present. In this sense, The Special Committee against Apartheid was unique when it became, through activities to a large extent initiated by Reddy, a crucial node in the network of transnational anti-apartheid activism that was created from the early 1960s and onwards. The committee supplied anti-apartheid organisations with well-researched information material and, from the late 70s, in a few cases some financial support. The committee also sent delegations to various countries to consult with national and international NGOs.[14] However, the most important aspect of the activities of the committee was the organisation of conferences, where representatives from anti-apartheid organisations could come and make important contacts.[15] Here, information was exchanged, overall strategies were discussed, co-operation on campaigns, national as well as international, were co-ordinated, and friendships were made. However, according to Reddy, these events did not only help the NGO-representatives to meet each other, but also to contact OAU and representatives of African governments.[16]

The activities of the Special Committee were not always popular in the UN. The Western countries never joined the committee, it consisted of representatives mainly from Asian, African and Latin American countries, as well as a few from Eastern Europe. However, this was something that according to Reddy provided a certain space for action that would not have been there in the presence of the dominant Western powers, that opposed sanctions against South Africa. Reddy recalls one occasion, that illustrates the scepticism and even the hostility that the Special Committee sometimes met in the UN. As the committee organised a meeting on anti-apartheid in the UN building, they put up posters, some of them made by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, that was strongly critical of British companies with investments in South Africa. This upset the British mission to the UN, and they approached a more senior official in the UN to exert pressure on Reddy.[17] Also, the fact that Manhattan, through the activities of the committee, became a place of pilgrimage for various of representatives of liberation and solidarity movements, often defining their projects in terms of revolutionary discourse, of course did not please the US government. According to Jennifer Davis, a South African exile and a leading activist in the New York based solidarity organisation American Committee of Africa (ACOA), the UN was not popular in the US during the Cold War, ”it was regarded as the creature of somebody else – either the 3rd world or the Soviet Union”.[18] Davis states that the conferences organised by the committee were extremely important for ACOA, as well as for the international anti-apartheid movement. According to Davis, what really mattered was not so much what happened during the formal sessions, but what took place in context of the informal meetings in between them.

Since the 1970s, alternative NGO-conferences are regularly held “outside” of the large official UN meetings.[19] Dennis Herbstein, writer and journalist that left South Africa for London, and who has done extensive research on the role of the IDAF (International Defence and Aid Fund) in the anti-apartheid struggle, states that it was Reddy who, through his work with the Special Committee, “invented” the alternative conference.[20] Jennifer Davis agrees: “Reddy created a space for people to get together”, as he “pushed the limits of what people wanted to allow him to do, apparently in a very non-confrontative way”. In this sense the Special Committee was a crucial facilitator in the process that, according to Davis, “mobilised civil society, even if we did not use that expression then”.[21]

It must be underlined that all of Reddys important international contacts were not on the NGO-level. He also had close relations with politicians and civil servants representing nation states that actively supported the anti-apartheid struggle. In the case of Sweden and the other Nordic countries, Reddy had more frequent and closer contacts on the governmental level than on the NGO-level. The anti-apartheid commitment expressed by the Nordic governments provided opportunities to “open up” the bipolar division that defined the articulation of any issue in the UN during the Cold War. According to Reddy, the Special Committee had a strategy to

“…separate the Nordic countries from the major Western powers which were the real problem, so we followed that, and worked with the Nordic countries and slowly other smaller Western countries started following the Nordic countries.”[22]

 

In the case of Britain, the AAM was his main contact. Reddy states that the British AAM undoubtedly was the most important of the national anti-apartheid solidarity organisations in the world. In relation to for example the Swedish anti-apartheid organisations, the Special committee’s relation to the AAM in London was, according to Reddy, “a very different thing, it was like allies discussing, almost like a discussion with the liberation movement”.[23]

This quote also points to the weight that the Special Committee put on relations with the liberation movements.[24] Although the Committee, following the decision of OAU, supported both PAC and ANC, the Special Committees’ contacts with ANC might be considered as more intimate, and on a personal level particularly so between Reddy and the ANC exile leader Oliver Tambo.[25] Accordingly, it was in dialogue with the liberation movements that The Special Committe developed the strategies that would guide its transnational anti-apartheid work.

In 1966, three main lines of action were agreed upon for the work against apartheid in the UN: 1) pressure on the South African government to abandon apartheid, and to seek a peaceful solution with “the genuine representatives of all the people of South Africa”, 2) appropriate assistance to the victims of apartheid and those who struggle against it, for a society in which all people would enjoy equal rights and opportunities, 3) dissemination of information to focus world public opinion on the inhumanity of apartheid.[26]

Reddy states that the first two lines of action of course were fundamental, but since the first could not be made effective as long as sanctions was not agreed upon in the Security Council, and as assistance to the struggle against apartheid was also met by resistance from the dominant Western powers in the UN, the third aspect became increasingly important. He explains the situation:

“Without information, you can’t do the other things (1 and 2, author’s remark), without public opinion you can’t do these things, so you had to inform and educate the public opinion, mobilise the public opinion, so that you can have sanctions and assistance to the victims of apartheid. In that sense media and information was very important.”[27]

 

London and Stockholm in exile

Sobizana Mngqikana was born in East London, South Africa in 1938. As many other ANC leaders and activists he went to study at the Fort Hare University. In 1961, a year after the ANC was banned, he became active in the underground structures of the organisation. His anti-apartheid activities led to his expulsion from the university in 1962, and in 1963 he was arrested and sent to jail.

As he was released, he saw an ad in the Cape Times about a scholarship sponsored by the University of London. He applied, succeeded and arrived in London in 1964. A couple of minutes walk from the students hostel where he was staying, the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, had its office. When Mngqikana visited the office, he learned that there was an ANC office in London. The ANC representative, Raymond Kunene, put Mngqikana in touch with a group of his own age, among them Thabo Mbeki, who became a close friend. The group formed what they called The ANC Student and Youth Section, its task being mainly political education in the context of the black South African exile community. Members of the group were also often invited by the AAM to address public meetings, in order to represent ”authentic voices” of South Africa. After finishing his studies he joined the ANC staff at full time in 1969. In 1973 a decision was made that the ANC should open a mission in Sweden (the second in Europe).[28] By this time ANC had established close contacts with the Social Democratic government, and was receiving a substantial financial support.[29]

“There were many contrasts between living and working as a black and as a political activist in London and Stockholm respectively. In terms of everyday life in London,

You had to realise that you were black…I was told when I phoned to ask for a flat, ‘we don’t take blacks here’…When I came here (to Sweden) it was more of an open society, comparatively speaking…there was no overt hostility to one as a black person.”[30]

 

Also, in terms of working as an anti-apartheid activist in England in the 60s,

“…there was a lot of hostility, we were called terrorists you know, and there was a strong opposition from the government, the Conservative Party, so it was not easy there, it was a challenge to penetrate British Society, whereas in Sweden, there was an understanding, a revulsion against racism and apartheid. But of course there was a difference as how to tackle the issue, that was where the problems started between myself and some of the people who were working here.”

 

The problems that Mngqikana is referring to started soon after he had arrived, as he felt caught in the web of conflict-ridden relations of the Swedish political arena of the early 70s. If the churches, the Unions, the Social Democratic Party, the Liberals and the Africa Groups (a post 68 solidarity organisation) all expressed a commitment to the anti-apartheid struggle, it was also affected by their different and conflicting agendas in relation to national as well as international politics. Much of the tension was of course related to the Cold War divide. In certain circles to the right as well as to the left, ANC was regarded with suspicion because of its alliance with the South African Communist Party, as well as its contacts with the Soviet Union, and was even in some cases perceived as a “pro-Soviet force”, steered by Moscow.

In 1970s even old supporters from the early 60s was critisising ANC for its Soviet contacts. In 1977, Mngqikana got involved in a public debate about the issue with Per Wästberg, the leading anti-apartheid journalist and writer in Sweden since the early 60s, and at the time chief editor of the liberal Dagens Nyheter, Swedens largest daily.[31]

Mngqikana’s mission in Sweden was, in line with ANC:s strategy of “rainbow politics”, to seek to broaden ANC:s support in Sweden.[32] The model was the cooperation between ANC and the inclusive and broad anti-apartheid coalition in Britain. One of the tensions that Mngqikana encountered in this work was related to an internal divide within the Labour movement regarding its strategy in relation to the anti-apartheid struggle.[33] While the SDP leadership under Olof Palme had decided not to look at ANC through Cold War lenses, and give the organisation full support, the Unions were more sceptical toward ANC and its call for isolation of South Africa. In fact, in the debate on isolation vs. involvement (the latter was in Sweden called “the new strategy”) in the 1970s, the blue collar LO and the white collar TCO – under the umbrella of ICFTU (International Confederation of Trade Unions) – “embraced the`new strategy´”.[34]

The position taken by LO and TCO at this time must be related to international conflicts as well as national interests. First, the strong “anti-communism” within ICFTU did not make ANC popular, since its main union ally at this time was SACTU (South African Confederation of Trade Unions), that was affiliated to the Communist-dominated WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions). Second, support to isolation might have been limited by the fact that it could be seen to contradict the “self-interest” of the organisations, since it could have the consequence of creating unemployment in Sweden.

However, since this position was not uncontroversial, in 1974 LO and TCO, following the example of the British Trade Union Congress (TUC), decided to send a “fact-finding mission” to South Africa. As soon as the mission was publicly announced it was heavily criticised. Mngqikana, for the first time making himself known to the Swedish public in an interview in public radio, argued that the mission would serve as a recognition of the apartheid regime and denounced the trip as a “propaganda stunt”.[35]

In this criticism against of the Unions, Mngqikana got support from the Africa groups (AGIS), a Swedish NGO, which also protested publicly against the trip. However, this did not mean that the relations between the ANC representative and the Africa Groups was easy – at least not in the beginning. Through the small but politically active South African exile community – also ridden by conflicts between supporters of PAC, ANC and the Unity Movement - Mngqikana soon after his arrival got in contact with the Africa Groups. The Africa Groups was part of a young and fervent, Marxist oriented left wing political culture, that had come out of the student protest of the late 60s, now forming different ideological and party fractions, as well as solidarity organisations focused on different parts of the world.[36] When Mngqikana arrived, AGIS had mainly been focusing their work on the Portugese colonies and had not yet recognised ANC as a leading force in the South African struggle (which they did in November 1974).[37] As Mngqikana soon after his arrival was invited to a meeting held by AGIS, he was confronted with the statement that ANC was “run by Moscow”. The speaker referred to a study book on “imperialism and struggle for liberation” in Africa, written and published by AGIS. In the book, FRELIMO, MPLA och PAIGC are referred to as the avantgarde organisations of the African struggle for liberation, praised for their “successful struggle for liberation since the early 60s”. ANC, on the other hand, is criticised both for their non-violent strategy in the 50s and for being too close to the Soviet Union.[38]

In spite of these differences, the young leftist political culture that AGIS was part of was familiar to Mngqikana. In fact it was a transnational political culture born out of the global student activism of the late 60s. The activists belonged to his generation, they were all Marxists of some kind and Mngqikana did not mind discussing how to fight imperialism. However, the fact that Mngqikana was seen mixing in these circles awoke criticism in other political camps. At one occasion Oliver Tambo told Mngqikana that he had recieved a letter from a Swedish MP for the Social Democrats, complaining that the ANC representative was “flirting with people who are attacking us” (“us” referring to the Labour movement), indicating that if this continued, it could mean that the support to the ANC was withdrawn.

However, at the end of the 70s this situation would start to change, partly as a consequence of Mngqikanas effort to bring together the conflicting camps of the Swedish anti-apartheid movement. In 1979, the same year that Lindiwe Mabusa replaced Sobizana Mngqikana as ANC representative in Stockholm, AGIS initiated a new organisation, ISAK (The Isolate South Africa Committee), quite similar to the British AAM. It was a broad umbrella organisation, including solidarity organisations, churches, the Youth Sections of all the political parties except the Conservatives, and a few unions. In this process, relations between AGIS and the unions were stabilised, even though parts of the Union movement would continue to oppose the call for isolation of South Africa, something that at certain moments made the issue of anti-apartheid strategy hotly debated in the Swedish public arena.[39]

 

III. Contexts, conflicts, forms of action and processes of identification

Contexts: A world of nations, the Cold War and the Colonial Legacy

In retrospect, support to the struggle against apartheid in South Africa might appear to have been something uncontroversial, at least in post-war democratic societies. And sometimes it was. For example, it was easy to get public attention for anti-apartheid organisations immediately after the Sharpville shootings in 1960, the Soweto uprisings in 1976 or the killing of Steven Biko in 1977, events that were extensively reported by mass media and caused a moral outrage all over the world. But, as we have seen, to sustain support to the liberation struggle in South Africa against apartheid through the decades from the 1950s until the 1990s, was not always an easy affair.

In order to understand and analyse the dynamic of the anti-apartheid struggle, following the approach to social movements outlined earlier, we must not only focus on conflicts between the movement and its adversaries, but on the complex pattern of conflicts and contradictions within the space of action that the movement constituted. Linking the inside and outside of the movement, the “inner” tensions and differences of the anti-apartheid struggle should be seen as articulations of the conflicts that was an integral part of the historical and social contexts that conditioned its action space. Three such contexts that were crucial will be briefly discussed below.

 

1. The Cold War divide

Globalisation of politics during the post war era was to a large extent a matter of the division of any significant political field, national as well as international, along the Cold War lines. The Cold War was a crucial factor in the circumstances that made it possible for the South African apartheid government to sustain its position internationally. It was also the Cold War that made it possible to define ANC as part of a bloc that threatened world peace and security. At certain moments, anti-apartheid action in this context constructed what Homi Bhabha has called a third space, understood as “an intervention into a situation that has become extremely polarized”.[40] As a position, “third space” does not signify neutrality, rather it is a condition in which the conflicts, contradictions and ambivalences of a political order is felt most strongly. This was, for example, the condition in which the ANC representative to Sweden in the early 70s had to act. It was also the condition of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid during the Cold War.

The apartheid issue points to the “janus face” of the UN as a central institution of global politics. On the one hand, as an international organisation, the UN is subjected to the power hierarchy of the inter-state system. The dominant state powers in the Security Council can block or manipulate decisions in accordance with their national interests, as was the case with the issue of effective sanctions against South Africa. On the other hand, the UN might also be seen as a part of a global civil society, as relatively independent UN organisations like the Special Committee interact with NGO:s from various countries, bypassing the state level, and giving space for transnational social movements opposing the interests of dominant state powers.

 

2. The legacy of colonialism

If the world was becoming increasingly “post-colonial” during the period of the anti-apartheid struggle, the Cold War might still be seen as a rearticulation of the political, economical and cultural links established during the colonial era. The legacy of colonialism was not just present in the inter-state alliances in the UN Security Council, opposing isolation of South Africa, but also in the movement itself, creating tensions and ambivalences. Perhaps this was most evident in the churches, as for example is shown in the case of Gunnar Helander, who in the 1930s went to South Africa to spread the word of Swedish protestantism, coming back to Europe in the late 50s on a completely different mission, becoming a leading anti-apartheid journalist and author in Sweden.[41] On the one hand the presence of the European churches in Southern Africa was the cultural part of colonialism. On the other hand, many key activists and prominent figures of the anti-apartheid movement were based in the churches, for example Albert Luthuli of ANC, Trevor Huddleston of AAM, Canon John Collins of IDAF and George Houser of ACOA. Still, old colonial links in some cases influenced positions that were taken, as was the case with for example the Swedish Church in relation to the Zulu leader Gatsha Buthelezi as well as in relation to the debate on sanctions vs. constructive involvement.[42]

 

3. A world of nations

Perhaps the most important aspect of world politics during the 20th century was the global dissemination of the nation state as a specifically modern connection between the state as political construction and the nation as a cultural construction, or an “imagined community”. National identity was an unquestionable fundament in post-war politics, including the anti-colonial struggle. [43] Just as it was never really questioned that the anti-colonial movements should construct their identities through a rearticulation of the nationalist discourse that was an integral part of European colonialism, it was as self-evident that solidarity movements should express the solidarity of different “nations”. For example, according to Christabel Guerney, the South Africans that initiated AAM in Britain, “had the vision to see that, if it was to grow, the Movement must put down British roots”.[44]

It was with reference to the principle of national self-determination that South Africa claimed that any criticism of apartheid was an intervention in its “internal affairs”, a discursive strategy that in 1973 was countered in the UN General Council by a resolution stating that it was the liberation movements (ANC and PAC) that was the authentic representatives of the (national) people of South Africa.[45]

As a context for political action, the nation state also influenced the way that the anti-apartheid movement was constructed in different parts of the world, as is evident in the British and Swedish cases.[46] Of crucial importance were of course the different state policies in relation to South Africa. Whether it was Conservative or Labour governments, the position of the British State on South Africa was heavily influenced by its membership in NATO, major British economic interests in South Africa, as well as other links going back to the Imperial era. Against this background it was not surprising that the anti-apartheid movement in Britain was in strong opposition to the state, and never received any governmental funding.[47]

In contrast to this, the Swedish state had a completely different agenda in relation to international politics. Sweden’s aid to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa could partly be seen as a strategy of promoting the growth of an international community of alliance-free states, whose “parallelity of interests” eventually would be of benefit for Sweden.[48] The extensive support to the ANC from the Swedish state, under the rule of social-democrats as well as right-wing coalitions, could also partly be understood in relation to contacts between ANC leaders and young social democratic and liberal internationalists in the 50s and 60s. However, more importantly, it was also the result of pressure from the Swedish anti-apartheid movement that emerged in the early 60s. Partly due to a “political culture of consensus” that had emerged as part and parcel with the construction of the Swedish welfare state, relations between the movement and the state were close from the beginning to the end, although criticism from the movement persisted through the years, even after the legislation against new investments by Swedish companies in South Africa in 1979, and the boycott legislation in 1987.[49]

Let us now turn to the means and strategies through which anti-apartheid action was constituted and sustained beyond different national contexts. What made it possible to constitute and sustain transnational anti-apartheid action?

 

Forms of transnational action: mobilisation, organisation, media and mobility

I would like to argue that the central aspects of the anti-apartheid movement as a global movement, and as part of a much wider process of political globalisation, can be analysed through the following interrelated themes: organisation, mobilisation, media and mobility (travel).

 

1. Transnational organisation and mobilisation

As in the case of most social movements, a crucial aspect the mobilisation in the anti-apartheid movement was done through movement organisations. Some of them were national, like the AAM, some of them were international, like the IDAF, and some of them consisted of networks of local groups, like the South Africa Committees and the Africa Groups (before they were formed into a national organisation) in Sweden. These organisations were all part of a transnational solidarity network, which had at least two important nodes on the northern hemisphere; London as a “postcolonial capital”, where South African exiles initiated AAM, and New York, where the UN Special Committee against Apartheid played a crucial role as a space where activists could interact with each other and sometimes also with government representatives. The anti-aparthied struggle also involved alliances between states and actors in global civil society, as states in a few cases funded, and exchanged information with, movement organisations across national borders. For example, the Swedish government supported the British Defence and Aid Fund, which was in strong opposition to the policy of the British government.

The British AAM was started in 1959 under the name of The Boycott Movement, and I would argue that the boycott continued to be the most important form of mobilisation in the context of the anti-apartheid movement.[50] The ultimate aim of the economic, cultural and sports boycotts was of course to put pressure on the South African government through isolating the country culturally and hurting it economically. However, as several activists that I have interviewed have pointed out, the anti-apartheid organisations also viewed the boycott as an important tool for mobilisation and “consciousness raising” of large numbers of people. Through the launching of boycott campaigns, the organisations offered people an opportunity for “everyday” participation in solidarity action. In the long run, it is argued, such active participation would generally raise public consciousness about the issue, and eventually increase the pressure on national governments and international organisations, like UN or EU, to impose sanctions. From this point of view, to participate in a boycott could also be seen as “voting” for sanctions (the British AAM called boycott action “people’s sanctions”). It could also be argued that participating in a boycott could be seen as a form of expressive action that was a fundamental aspect of the construction of the collective identity of the movement. It was an act through which the individual subject could feel that s/he became a part of an imagined global community of solidarity activists. In this sense, the boycott was a form of “identification at a distance” through local action. From this point of view the boycott also emotionally connected grass-roots activists in different parts of the world.

 

2. Transnational media space

As we have seen, media and information work was a crucial part of anti-apartheid activism. The rise of the international anti-apartheid movement parallels with the growth of a transnational media space, which can be see as a part of the process of globalisation.[51] This is not only a space for the immediate transmission of news across the globe, but also a site of political struggle, where different political actors, through symbolic actions, are trying to influence opinions.

Since the 1960s new social movement groups and organisations are increasingly staging media oriented public manifestations addressing a global audience.[52] At the same time movement mobilisations are sometimes shaped in response to events that are globally reported by the media; movement intellectuals and groups are taking part in the struggle over the interpretation of the political implications of these events. Sometimes political mobilisations have taken place simultaneously around the world in an immediate response to events reported globally by the media. This was for example the case with the reports on the shots in Sharpville in 1960, which lead to an intensified mobilisation against apartheid in different parts of the world.

However, media attention related to dramatic events in South Africa was short-lived. During long periods anti-apartheid activists experienced difficulties to get a voice in public space. In response to this, an active approach to media was developed. This involved the two interrelated strategies of trying to influence established media, and to develop alternative media.

The strategy of developing alternative media consisted in producing and distributing information through self-controlled channels. News bulletins, magazines as well as films and videos were produced and distributed to members and sold publicly. The material of bulletins like AA News in Britain (that was also read by activists in other countries) or Afrikabulletinen in Sweden often relied on sources within the movement’s transnational information networks. Here, contacts in South Africa established by activists played an important role.

Building up archives of well-researched information material and photographs, as was the case with for example IDAF in London or ISAK in Stockholm, was also a base for attracting established media. There were also activists that worked as free lance journalists, publishing articles in alternative as well as established media, a few of them leaving the movement for a journalist career. Established media was approached in a number of ways; through producing information material designed for journalists, through letters to the editor, often signed by prominent members, and through developing contacts with journalists that was perceived as standing close to the movement.[53] A different way of getting a message across was the dramaturgical approach to political communication, performed through the staging of ”events” in public space. For example AAM in Britain in 1970, on Sharpville day, ”recreated” the shootings as activists dressed as policemen were ”shooting” at protesters in Trafalgar Square.[54]

 

3. Mobility: travel and exile

The “action at a distance” that constituted anti-apartheid as a global movement was not only facilitated by the media but also by mobility, i. e. temporary travel, student visits facilitated by scholarships as well as “exile journeys”. This made face-to-face interaction possible between individual activists that were based in different parts of the world or were coming from different places of origin. Of course, far from all of the people who participated in the movement travelled, but among those who did were key activists, who could be understood as “spiders” in the webs of global anti-apartheid activism.[55] They were people like Michel Lapsley, who through individual moves and movements were connecting places, organisations and networks.

Travel, or mobility, had different functions within the movement. First, as we have seen, conferences played an important role as a space for networking, discussions and co-ordination of national as well as transnational campaigns. Second, the exile South Africans played an important role as organisers and mobilisers, travelling extensively around the world, making speeches at solidarity meetings and thus giving “the other” a public face.

Third, according to accounts of solidarity activists travel was related to an emotional aspect of solidarity activism, crucial for the individual’s motivation to engage in, as well as to sustain, solidarity action through the years. For some activists journeys to Southern Africa meant making direct experiences of the apartheid system that became a starting point for a commitment to the struggle. More important, travel facilitated personal encounters between South African activists and solidarity activists, sometimes developing into friendships. Some activists mention temporary visits by South Africans, for example by the UDF in the 80s, as an important source of inspiration for the everyday routines of solidarity activism. It seems however, that it was the presence of exile South Africans that was the most important aspect in the process of giving “the other” a face on the level of personal relations in the context of the solidarity movement. Hence, through making identification with “distant others” something concrete for grassroots activists, travel seemed to have been a crucial element in making anti-apartheid solidarity possible.

 

Conclusion: A global civil society

During the last decade, the emergence of a global or international civil society has been discussed in the social sciences as well as in public discourses.[56] In the more recent discussions, the internet is often highlighted as something that has made the construction of an effective global civil society possible. However, I would like to argue that more importantly, the present “global civil society” has historical links to the post-war, transnational political culture that the anti-apartheid movement was part of.

This political culture can be understood as part of an emerging globalisation of politics, taking place predominantly after the 2nd World War. In this historical context a new, global political space emerges, constituted by three interrelated phenomena that, consequently, played a crucial role in facilitating global anti-apartheid action:

a) the new media which creates new possibilities for political communication over large distances, the creation of b) transnational networks of individuals, groups and organisations, made possible not only through the new media, but also by face-to-face interaction facilitated by the increased possibilities of travel, following the growth of global air traffic after the second world war. Not the least important, these networks must also be seen in the context of post-colonial migration, c) the rise and consolidation of new “global” documents and institutions, predominantly Human Rights and the UN.

Against this background, the collective action of the Anti-Apartheid movement could be seen as part of the construction of an emerging global civil society. Hence, if the movement played an important role in the process in which apartheid was abolished, its impact was not limited to the South African context. It involved learning processes that have been carried into different levels of present global politics.[57]

 

References

Abrahamsson, H. (1997): Seizing the Opportunity: Power and Powerlesness in a Changing World Order.

Göteborg: PADRIGU, Department of Peace and Development Research, Gothenburg University.

Adler, G. & Webster, E. (eds.) (2000): Trade Unions and Democratization in South Africa., Witwatersrand: Witwatersrand U. P.

Afrikagrupperna (1972): Afrika. Imperialism och befrielsekamp. Lund: Afrikagrupperna i Sverige.

Anderson, B. (1991): Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso

Anheier, H. Glasius, M. & Kaldor, M. (2001): Global Civil Society 2001. Oxford: Oxford U.P.

Beinart, W. (1994): Twentieth Century South Africa. Oxford: Oxford U.P.

Bhabha, Homi K. (1994): The Location of Culture. London & New York: Routledge.

Bond, P. (2001): Against Global Apartheid: South Africa Meets the World Bank, IMF and International Finance. Cape Town: UCD Press.

Crawford, N. C. & Klotz, A. (eds.) (1999): How Sanctions Work. Lessons From South Africa. London: MacMillan.

Dagens Nyheter 7/9 1977.

Dagens Nyheter 17/9 1977.

Della Porta, D., Kriesi, H. & Rucht (eds.) (1999): Social Movements in A Globalizing World. London: MacMillan.

Dickenson, D. (1997): ”Counting Women in: Globalization, Democratization and the Women’s Movement”, In McGrew, A. (ed.) (1997): The Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Eyerman, R. & Jamison, A. (1991): Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach: Pennsylvania: Penn State U.P.

Friedman, S. & Atkinson, D. (1994): The Small Miracle: South Africa’s Negotiated Settlement. Johannesburg: Ravan’s Press.

Guerney, C. (2000): ”’A Great Cause’: The Origins of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, June 1959-March 1960”, in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 26. No. 1.

Hirst, P. & Thompson, G. (1996): Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance. Cambridege: Polity Press.

Held, D., McGrew, A. Goldblatt, D. & Perraton, J. (1999): Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hobsbawm, E. (1990): Nations and Nationalisms since 1790: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge U.P.

Keane, J. (1991): Media and Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Keane, J. (1998): Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions. Stanford: Stanford U.P.

Korey, W. (1998): NGO:s and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. New York: St Martin’s Press.

Klotz, A. (1995) Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid. Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press.

Massie, R. K. (1997): Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years. New York: Doubleday.

Melucci, A. (1996): Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age. Cambridge: Cambridge U.P.

Nordenmark, O. (1991) Aktiv utrikespolitik: Sverige - Södra Afrika 1969-1987. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.

Odén, B. & Ohlson, T. (1994): “South Africa – A Conflict Study”, in Odén, B. et. al., The South African Tripod: Studies of Economics, Politics and Conflict. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Peterson, A. & Thörn, H. (1994): ”Social Movements as Communicative Praxis - a Case Study of the Plowshares movement", i YOUNG. Nordic Journal for Youth Research, 2/94.

Peterson, A. & Thörn, H. (1999): "Movimientos sociales y modernidad de los medios de communicación. Industria de los medios de communicación: amigos o enemigos?”, in Comunicación y Sociedad nr. 35.

Price. R. (1991): The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975-1990. Oxford: Oxford U.P.

Reddy, E. S (1986): Apartheid: The United Nations and the International Community: A Collection of Speeches and Papers. New Delhi: Vikas.

Reddy, E. S. (1987): Struggle for Freedom in Southern Africa: its International Significance. New Delhi: Mainstream.

Seekings, J. (2000): The UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front in South Africa 1983-1991. Claremont: David Philip.

Sellström, T. (1999): Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, vol 1: Formation of a popular opinion 1950-1970. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Sellström, T. (2002): Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, vol 2: Solidarity and Assistance 1970-1994. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Shepherd, G. W. (1977): Anti-Apartheid: Transnational Conflict and Western Policy in the Liberation of South Africa. London: Greenwood Press.

Starr, A. (2000): Naming the Enemy - Anti-Corporativist Movements Confront Globalization. Annandale: Pluto Press.

United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994. New York 1994

Thompson, John B. (1995): The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Thörn, H. (1996): "Globalisering och sociala rörelser: Folkrörelsesverige i Sydafrika", i Sociologisk Forskning nr. 1

Thörn, H. (1997): Modernitet, sociologi och sociala rörelser, Göteborg: Sociologiska institutionen.

Thörn, H. Globaliseringens dimensioner: Nationalstat, världssamhälle, demokrati och sociala rörelser. Stockholm 2002:

Wallerstein, I. (1991): Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World System. Cambridge: Cambridge U.P.

Wignaraja, P. (ed.) (1992): New Social Movements in the South. London: Zed.

Worden, N. (1994): The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Segregation and Apartheid. Oxford: Blackwell.

Worsnip, M. (1996): Priest and Partisan: A South African Journey. Melbourne: Ocean Press.

 

Interviews

(47 interviews have been carried out for the research project on which this article is based. The followingare referred to in the text):

Jennifer Davis, New York, 000620.

Ethel de Keyser, London, 000303.

Denis Herbstein, London, 000229.

George Houser, New York, 000620.

Michael Lapsley, Göteborg, 000615.

Sobizana Mngqikana, Stockholm, 000216.

Johan Nordenfelt, Stockholm, 000531.

Enuga S. Reddy, New York, 000621.

Michael Terry, London, 000307.

 

 



[1] Seekings, 2000, Adler & Webster, 2000, Beinart, 1994.

[2] Friedman & Atkinson, 1994, Abrahamsson, 1997.

[3] Worden, 1994, Odén & Ohlson, 1994.

[4] Crawford & Klotz (eds.), 1999, Massie, 1997. Of course, most research make arguments for a combination of “internal” and external” factors, although giving some more weight than others. For an example of such an analysis, with a high level of sophistication, see Price, 1991, where two internal factors, economic decline and political violence, interacts with international pressure.

[5] However, in 1990 the violence of apartheid reached across the border from South Africa as he was targeted by a letter bomb, loosing both hands and an eye. He finally returned to South Africa in 1992 and got involved in work with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TCR).

[6] Interview with Michael Lapsley. For a biography on Lapsley, see Worsnip, 1996.

[7] In the debate on globalisation, some scholars make a distinction between internationalisation and globalisation (i.e. Hirst & Thompson, 1996), while others, including this author, view globalisation as a process involving a complex interplay between international and transnational processes, Held et. al., 1999), Thörn, 2002.

[8] This article is based on a research project carried out at the Department of Sociology, Göteborg University, and partly financed by HSFR. Empirically, the project has mainly been focused two national contexts - Sweden and Britain. An important aim of the research project is to look at to what extent national differences influenced the way that the anti-apartheid struggle was articulated in Sweden and Britain respectively, and to what extent networks, experiences and identities was formed through international and transnational communication between the organisations, groups and individuals based in the different countries. In this article, however, I am mainly focusing on the latter aspect. The empirical material of this study consists of three types of material: 1) interviews with 47 individuals that were involved in anti-apartheid action, mostly activists based in Britain and Sweden (but also a few based in USA and South Africa), journalists and a few public officials and, 2) material from the archives of the anti-apartheid movements in Britain (AAM and ANC London) and Sweden (The Africa Groups and ISAK), 3) material from press archives in Sweden and Britain.

[9] Melucci, 1997, Wignaraja (ed.), 1993, Della Porta, Kriesi, Rucht (eds.), 1999, Held et. al., 1999.

[10] Thompson, 1995, p. 82.

[11] This is an understanding of social movements influenced mainly by the works of Melucci, 1996 and Eyerman & Jamison, 1991. See also Thörn, 1997.

[12] E. S. Reddy has himself written extensively on the anti-apartheid struggle, see Reddy, 1986 and Reddy, 1987.

A collection of his articles, as well as biographical data, is available at the ANC Historical Documents Archive, www.anc.org.za/un/reddy. On the role of Reddy’s and The Special Committee Against Apartheid, see also Korey, 1998 and Shepherd, 1977.

[13] Interview with E. S. Reddy.

[14] For example, expenses for NGOs to participate in Committee-sponsored conferences, seminars and sessions were provided. However, the budget of the Committe was limited and it could only provide expenses for a few anti-apartheid groups that did not have expenses for travel. Interview with E. S. Reddy. See also Korey, 1998, p. 96.

[15] This is according to activists that I have interviewed. Among the people that have stated that Reddy and the Special Committe played an extremely important role in facilitating the transnational mobilisation of the anti-apartheid movement are key activists in Britain and USA like Mike Terry (AAM), Jennifer Davis and George Houser (ACOA) as well as journalist and author Dennis Herbstein. According to Reddy, leaders of anti-apartheid NGOs were invited to all conferences and seminars organised but the Special Committee, with full rights of participation. The Committee also, according to Reddy “avoided distinctions between government representatives and NGOs in the conduct of discussions” as it elected NGO representatives as officers of its seminars and conferences. In some cases the committee formally organised international anti-apartheid events in cooperation with anti-apartheid organisations, Korey, 1998, p. 96 and interview with E. S. Reddy.

[16] Note submitted by Reddy to the author 000621.

[17] Interview with E. S. Reddy.

[18] Interview with Jennifer Davis.

[19] As for example at the Beijing Women’s Conference in 1995, where 4000 NGO:s gathered for the alternative meeting, Dickenson, 1997.

[20] Interview with Denis Herbstein. Herbstein has written a yet unpublished manuscrpit on the IDAF: ”White Lies – The Secret War Against Apartheid”.

[21] Interview with Jennifer Davis.

[22] For example, the Nordic countries were consulted before anti-apartheid resolutions were presented to the General Assembly. In order to get as wide support on as many issues as possible, a number of resolutions on different issues were constructed. All the provisions which the Nordic countries could not support were placed in one resolution, making it possible to get a positive “Nordic vote” on a number of other resolutions. Interview with E. S. Reddy.

[23] Interview with E.S. Reddy.

[24] This is also verified by Johan Nordenfelt, who was appointed the chairman of the UN Centre against Apartheid in 1987. In an interview that I carried out in 2000, Nordenfelt, in comparison with Reddy a more strict and ”non-activist” public servant, was highly critical of the fact that close relations with the liberation movements had been developed over the years. According to Nordenfelt, the Centre, as well as the Special Committee ”was percieved as first and foremost ANC:s, but also PAC:s, office of representation, that they were in command…they regarded it as their office and thought that we should follow their directives”. Interview with Johan Nordenfelt.

[25] According to Reddy, PAC had a particularly strong voice in the UN when it was represented by the charismatc David Sibekho. Interview with Reddy.

[26] The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994, p. 26.

[27] Several conferences on the role of media in the anti-apartheid struggle were organised by The Special Committe Against Apartheid in cooperation with other organisations. There was one in East Berlin in 1981, one in London in 1985 and one in Lima in 1988.

[28] By this time, there were six established ANC missions in the world: Lusaka, Dar es Salaam, Algiers, Cairo, New Delhi and London. Sellström, 2002, p. 398.

[29] The direct support to ANC from the Swedish state started in 1972/73 with the modest sum of 35 000 Swedish kronor (SEK). In the following year it increased to 215 000 SEK. By 1994, ANC had received a total sum of 896 million SEK, Sellström, 2002, p. 34, 397 and 900.

[30] Interview with Sobizana Mngqikana.

[31] Dagens Nyheter, 7/9 1977 och 17/9 1977.

[32] Interview with Sobizana Mngqikana.

[33] Mngqikana was received at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 1974 (Sellström, 2002, p. 398) and also had frequent contacts with the international secretary of the Social Democratic party, Bernt Carlsson, interview with with Sobizana Mngqikana.

[34] Quote from Sellström, 2002, p. 441.

[35] The interview was made in Dagens eko, and was also referred to in Dagens Nyheter 23/12 1974 (”Sydafriakresan blir ett propagandajippo”).

[36] In the early 60s in London, Mngqikana had met representatives from the locally constituted Swedish South Africa committees, one of the earliest transnational contacts of the AAM. The AAM had in fact been mentioned as a model in the discussions of the Swedish committees (Sellström, 1999, p. 219), and they also borrowed the ying and yang symbol that had been redefined as an anti-racist symbol by the AAM and was worn in the form of badges. However, these early solidarity organisations had in the early 70s been replaced by the Africa groups (AGIS), that to a large extent came out of the student based Anti-Vietnam War movement.

[37] Sellström, 2002, p. 429.

[38] Afrikagrupperna: Afrika. Imperialism och befrielsekamp, Lund 1972, p. 6 and 84ff.

[39] It was particularly the Metal union that publicly argued for “constructive involvement”.

[40] On the notion of ”third space”, Bhabha, 1994. The particular definition of the concept above was used in a lecture by Homi Bhabha, Göteborg 020919.

[41] Together with Per Wästberg, Gunnar Helander initiated Fonden för rasförtryckets offer (Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression in South Africa) in 1959, that served as the Swedish chapter of IDAF. Helander later also became vice-chairman of IDAF in London. Beginning with Zulu Meets the White Man in 1949, he wrote ten novels in ten years, all expressing criticism against apartheid. They were originally written in Swedish but were subsequently translated to English and eight other languages.

[42] When the World Council of Churches (WCC) in a meeting in Utrecht in 1972, following the UN General Assembly’s call for isolation of South Africa, adopted a policy of disinvestment some Evangelical Lutheran churches, among them the Church of Sweden, expressed a ”minority position” in the final resolution. This position, that advocated a policy of ”involvement” in order to improve the conditions for black workers in the foreign owned companies, was in Sweden called ”the new strategy” and was formally adopted by the Swedish Ecumenical Council in 1974. Although many intense debates on the issue of isolation vs. involvement were held within the networks of the Swedish churches, and ambivalence as well as internal opposition was frequently expressed, it was only in 1986 the Swedish Church started to sell off its shares in Swedish South Africa companies. In this matter, it is relevant mention the close contacts that the Swedish Church Mission had with chief Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu – a link going back to the late 19th century when the Mission started it’s South African adventure in Zululand (Sellström, 1999). Buthelezi was several times invited to Sweden by the Swedish Church Mission. On the relations between the Swedish Church Mission and Gatsha Buthelezi, as well as the adoption of the policy of “involvement” by the Swedish Ecumenical Council in 1974, see Sellström, 2002, 422ff. and 519ff.

[43] Anderson, 1991, Hobsbawm, 1990, Wallerstein, 1991.

[44] Guerney, 2000, p. 137-8.

[45] The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994, p. 30.

[46] Without being able to go deeper into the British and the Swedish cases, I would like to pinpoint three interrelated areas of national difference between the British and the Swedish cases: 1) the relations between the movement and the state, 2) the dominant national political culture that constituted the conditions for voicing anti-apartheid in public space, 3) the practices of national movement cultures, partly related to different traditions of popular movements.

[47] Britain had strong links with South Africa during the apartheid era and resisted sanctions both within the Commonwealth and the EEC, especially during the Thatcher years. However, between 1985 and 1987, Britain accepted restrictive ”measures”. In 1990, Britain was the first country to lift its sanctions, Klotz, 1995, chapter 7.

[48] In a Government Bill from 1962, called “the bible of Swedish development aid”, and written by a working group led by Olof Palme, it was argued that a “mutual interest” could develop between Sweden and “peoples in Asia and Africa who have recently won, or shortly will gain, full independence”, as these countries had a “policy of neutrality” in common. Quoted from Sellström, 1999, p. 67ff and 515f. Southern Africa was the most important region receiving Swedish aid during the period of the anti-apartheid struggle. According to Sellström, 1999 and 2002, up until 1994, a total sum of 4 billion SEK (of which 1,7 billion went to the liberation movements) was disbursed to Southern Africa by the Swedish government. Of the liberation movements, ANC was the most important recipient.

[49] SIDA set up the Consultative Committe on Humanitarian assistance in 1964, which was instrumental for the channelling of the Swedish financial support to the Southern African as well as to the Latinamerican liberation movements. NGO-people and opinion leaders were invited to the committee, Sellström, 1999, p. 70ff. Even though individuals from the two central solidarity organisations in the 70s and 80s, The Africa Groups and ISAK, were never invited to the committe, they received funding from SIDA. SIDA also recruited activists, who became civil servants, in some cases actually preparing meetings where the decisions on the support to the liberation movements in Southern Africa were made. On the role of the political cultural of consensus in relation to the Swedish anti-apartheid movement, see Thörn, 1996. On Swedens foreign policy in relation to South Africa, see Nordenmark, 1991.

[50] In 1960, the name was changed to Anti Apartheid Movement, Guerney, 2000.

[51] For example, in his influential book Media and Democracy, John Keane is emphasising the role of media in the "slow and delicate growth of an international civil society", Keane, 1991, p. 143.

[52] Peterson & Thörn, 1994 and Peterson & Thörn, 1997.

[53] As for example Victoria Brittain in Britain or Lars Herneklint in Sweden. In between movements and established media, there were a few individuals that played the role of public opinionmakers, often both authors and journalists by profession. They were often standing close to the movement, sometimes being part of it, but still saw themselves (and were seen) as independent. This was the case with for example Anthony Sampson and Colin Legum in Britain and Per Wästberg and Gunnar Helander in Sweden. Even though they were often appearing publicly in a national context, their “professional activism” was to a large extent transnational, as their books were translated to different languages, and as they travelled extensively.

[54] Interview with Ethel de Keyser.

[55] In a movement that included the participation of millions of people, the key activists were of course substantial.

[56] Keane, 1991 and Keane, 1998. There has also been an increasing interest in the growth of a global civil society after the events Seattle in 1999, in Prague in 2000, and in Genoa and Göteborg in the summer of 2001 (as well as in Johannesburg in August 2002), where the “global justice movement” (sometimes called the “anti-globalisation movement”) have been visible in the streets as well as in a globalised media space, Starr, 2000, Bond, 2001, Anheier, Glasius & Kaldor, 2001.

[57] During my research, I have encountered a number of examples of direct links between the anti-apartheid movement and present day global politics. An example of the fact that the learning processes of the anti-apartheid movement can be carried into very different contexts by different individuals, is shown in Ben Cashdan’s documentary ”The two Trevors go to Washington”. It follows two South Africans, Trevor Manuel and Trevor Ngwame, both of them former anti-apartheid activists, on their journey to the IMF/World Bank meeting in Washington in 2000. Trevor Manuel visits the meeting as South Africa’s Minister of Finance and as the chairman of the the boards of governors of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Trevor Ngwame is a grassroot activist from Soweto that goes to Washington to protest against the global policies of the IMF and the World Bank. In the film there is also a short interview with an activist participating in a demonstration in Washington, Dennis Brutus, a well known anti-apartheid activist that came to the US from South Africa in the 1960s after spending 22 months in Robben Island, and started SANROC (The South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee), that led the international campaign for a sports boycott on South Africa.

Home Home - Stolten's African Studies Resources
---------------------------------------------------
© Jakobsgaard Research
---------------------------------------------------